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Absence of Judicial Specialty 
Financial remedies (or money) work has a curious status in the family court. 
Children cases in the family court are subject to a careful allocation and gate-keeping 
procedure, following detailed guidance from the President of the Family Division to 
determine whether the case should be heard at Lay Justice, District Judge, Circuit Judge or 
High Court Judge level. The existence of this guidance sensibly recognises that children cases 
come with a wide range of difficulty and complexity and that the family court should 
accommodate this in its allocation of judicial resources. A ticketing scheme for private and 
public children cases is carefully administered to ensure that any judge hearing a children 
case is appropriately experienced and trained by the Judicial College.  
The same is not true of money work. There is no allocation or gate-keeping guidance or 
procedure. Almost all cases proceed at District Judge level. Allocation issues generally only 
arise if the case is a very rare one for which a High Court Judge may be needed (in which 
case reference needs to be made to the criteria in Mostyn J’s “Statement on the Efficient 
Conduct of Financial Remedy Hearings Allocated to be heard by a High Court Judge”). With a 
few exceptions there is no recognition of the existence of a mid-tier of cases to be heard at 
Circuit Judge level and so this rarely happens. Money work has no judicial ticketing 
requirement, and so any Deputy District Judge or District Judge can be expected to take on a 
money case load with little or no experience and no specialist training (beyond the 
minimum general induction course which includes only a few hours of very basic money 
training). Many of the judges at District Judge level hearing these cases will have no prior 
professional experience in this area of work, and so will first be exposed to this specialist, 
technical jurisdiction as judges. Many will be civil practitioners and/or spend most of their 
judicial time doing civil work.  
The fact that this state of affairs exists is probably the residue of the historic (pre-1969) 
situation where a High Court Judge would deal with the divorce (thought then to be the 
important issue) and adjourn “ancillary relief” or money issues to be dealt with by a 
Registrar as these issues were thought to be lesser matters. It looks increasingly 
anachronistic today where the main focus of the cost of divorce litigation will often be 
money issues and money cases which, if conducted by lawyers at all, are typically conducted 
by family lawyers who are specialist in money work. These specialists, and perhaps their 
clients, are frequently baffled and disappointed to find their case heard by a judge who has 
no such specialty. A significant number of these cases are, of course, now conducted by 
litigants-in-person. This creates a different, but perhaps even more serious scenario of 
nobody in the court having any experience of money cases. 
 
Money work as a portion of work in the family court 
This matters, partly because money cases make up a significant part of the family court case 
load.  HMCTS data published on 31 March 2016 record that in 2015 37,924 financial remedy 
cases were started - this compares, for example, with 15,999 public law case starts and 
43,390 private child case starts (all figures from Family Court Statistics Quarterly Q4 2015 
publication – see further details in appendix below). Excluding the large number of 
matrimonial case starts (the vast majority of which are processed entirely on paper), money 
cases constitute 29% of all types of family court case starts. In 2015, 67% of financial remedy 
applications and 65% of financial remedy disposals were uncontested, dealt with as pure 
consent order applications that require (for the most part) simple paper approval – on this 
basis, rounding the figures and assuming for the purpose of this exercise that the rates 
applicable to disposals are roughly equivalent to completed cases, around 24,700 paper 
approvals per year are necessary (again, for further discussion of our methodology, see the 
appendix). The remaining 35% of disposals (around 13,300 cases) require input from the 
court beyond the mere approval of a consent order. It is to be noted that financial remedy 
orders are made in a declining proportion of divorces, so that well over two-thirds of 
divorces now have no financial remedy at all: in 2003, 41% of all divorce cases started had a 
financial remedy order made, whilst in 2014, only 26.4% of cases did so.  Even taking into 
account for this increased tendency for couples to resolve financial issues entirely privately 
(unwisely? Cf. Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14) without securing their agreement via a 
consent order, financial remedies cases nevertheless remain a significant part of the family 
court’s business. They commonly require specialist assessment to ensure that they are fairly 
resolved, whether by consent or not. 
Absence of consistency of approach? 
This matters also because there is evidence to suggest that the system may produce an 
unacceptable level of inconsistency. The Law Commission paper on “Matrimonial Property, 
Needs and Agreements” (Law Com No.343) concluded: 
“so far as financial needs are concerned…there is evidence of significant differences 
in the way the law is applied, both between individual judges and between different 
areas of the country.  In so far as this produces real inconsistency rather than fact-
sensitivity, it is a cause for concern, particularly if it gives rise to forum shopping”. 
Any problem of real inconsistency, rather than proper fact-sensitivity, may become more 
acute as the introduction of divorce centres across the country works its way through to 
outcomes.  
Time was, the hard-pressed DJs and DDJs deciding these cases would get plenty of practice 
at doing money cases through their box work by dealing with consent order applications 
before they found themselves adjudicating a contested case. While making consent orders 
is in theory no less a judicial exercise than determining a contested case, the judge might – 
at least if one or both parties have had legal advice and assistance in preparing their consent 
order application – draw some reassurance from the fact that the application had already 
been through one or two legal professionals who could ordinarily be assumed to be satisfied 
that the proposed order was an acceptable one, at least given the constraints of the case 
(see Dinch v Dinch [1987] 1 WLR 252 but cf. more recently Minkin v Landsberg [2015] EWCA 
Civ 1152 on solicitors’ duties in this context).  Although the judge might approve the order 
as requested (the suggested judicial role being to act as a watchdog rather than a ferret: L v 
L [2008] 1 FLR 26) the new DJ or DDJ would perhaps be able to use the box work to “gauge 
the level” of this casework.  But not anymore.  
Unlike children cases, which are always handled separately from any connected matrimonial 
proceedings, financial remedy applications remain formally a matter “ancillary” to the 
divorce itself, the recommendation of the Financial Remedies Working Group that this be 
changed having not been implemented. The advent of divorce centres means that pure 
consent applications are now ordinarily being dealt with as part of the bulk-processing now 
being done by those centres. Unlike the divorces themselves, the money cases require 
judicial input throughout – contrast the enhanced role of legal advisors in dealing with 
divorce petitions.  Financial remedy applications are only sent for local attention at the 
applicant’s preferred venue if a hearing is required or the case is contested. Add to this the 
fact that proceedings are increasingly likely to involve one if not two litigants in person, and 
the inexperienced DJ or DDJ in the local court with limited if any background in money work 
may forgivably feel rather stretched by his or her first forays into FDAs, FDRs and, in 
extremis, the contested final hearing. (Extrapolating from table 6 of the latest FCS release, 
we can see that in 2011, 53% of divorces with a financial remedy aspect involved parties 
who were both represented, compared with 45% in 2015.) 
We think that all this, at very least, has implications for judicial training and ticketing. Even 
before the recent changes, it seems to us curious that money cases should not have been 
regarded as a specialist discipline meriting ticketing. Even low value cases may have 
complicated features, for example involving debts, companies, pensions and mortgage 
finance. Indeed, resolving complex issues appropriately in low value cases is arguably even 
more critical for those parties than the wealthy, who may be expected to emerge 
comfortably off whatever the detail of the outcome: for the low value case, inexpert 
handling of a difficult point may make a very real difference to the parties’ future standard 




A challenge to the use of Divorce Centres for money work 
We think it important, first, to ensure that the handling of consent order applications in the 
divorce centres does not become unduly routinised. Researchers (including Stephen 
Cretney, ‘From Status to Contract?’ in Rose (ed) Consensus ad Idem (Sweet & Maxwell, 
1996)) – and appellate courts (Pounds v Pounds [1984] 1 WLR 1535) – have previously 
expressed concern about how far the fairness of consent order applications can be properly 
adjudicated upon, not least given the limits of the paper-based application (though, 
alongside similar concerns, contrast the evidence of judicial intervention, in a few instances 
very robust, found by Hitchings, Miles and Woodward, Assembling the Jigsaw Puzzle: 
Understanding Financial Settlement on Divorce (University of Bristol, 2013)).  It is not yet 
clear from research or anecdotal report how the divorce centres are handling these cases 
and what impact, if any, the new system has had on outcomes or likelihood of judicial 
intervention prior to the order being approved.  From day 1 of the new regime, practitioners 
must have had to approach this on an “all bets are off” basis: where they might previously 
have felt confident that they knew what would get through their local court, they are now 
having to rebuild (what is no longer local) knowledge from scratch; even once they get some 
sort of “feel” for the mood of the divorce centres, they will presumably rarely know which 
judge might be signing off on their order when they send in the application. Quite aside 
from the practitioner experience, however, it is important to be confident that there is 
sufficient judicial resource – in terms of both quantity and quality – at the disposal of the 
divorce centres to ensure proper treatment of these applications. 
 
 
Ticketing for money work 
Turning to contested applications, we think it important that those handling these in the 
local courts have fuller training and expertise than is too often currently the case. This is 
vital to ensure that reliable and respected indications are given at FDRs to ensure a high 
settlement rate and at final hearings to ensure consistency and fairness. (The importance of 
good judicial conduct of FDRs to practitioners, clients and LIPs is evident from Hitching, 
Miles and Woodward’s research findings: (2013) above, pp 75-8, 121-4.) 
Accordingly, we consider that these cases merit ticketing and so handling by specialist 
judges, but we recognise that this reform on its own would be complicated and have 
resource implications, both in terms of the enhanced training that would be required for 
ticketing and then in terms of the burden this would place on listings officers to ensure 
adequate coverage of court business.   
 
A national network of Financial Remedy Units 
We consider that the best answer to all of the identified problems is to build on the 
initiative currently found at the Central Family Court in London – where money work is now 
conducted under the specialist facility known as the Financial Remedies Unit (FRU at the 
CFC). As an exception to the general rule, contested financial remedy applications can be 
issued directly in the FRU at the CFC (subject to a self-certification of complexity by the 
applicant) rather than to the divorce centre. The FRU sets out to employ Circuit Judges, 
Recorders, District Judges and Deputy District Judges who have a money specialty. More 
complex cases can be allocated to Circuit Judge level or full-time District Judge level as 
appropriate. Many of the problems we have identified should be avoided. There is a level of 
specialism in sui generis schemes in some limited parts of the country: for example, the 
Family Court in Manchester operates a “Money List” where a number of Circuit Judges who 
had a money specialty when in practice are allocated to hear unusually large or complicated 
money cases and in Birmingham where there is a level of informal money ticketing for 
District Judges. But otherwise, specialism does not exist. 
The desired level of specialisation could be achieved by the establishment of Financial 
Remedies Units around England and Wales. Plainly, a good deal of research would have to 
be done to ensure that the units were of the appropriate size to secure efficiency and 
specialism, and also in places which ensured a reasonable level of geographical access. The 
authors recognise the vital importance of ensuring that access to the FRUs is not so 
geographically difficult as to impede access to justice. To ameliorate this it should be 
possible in some instances for a judge from the Financial Remedies Unit to travel to a court 
outside the unit, if that were necessary for the convenience of the parties for a particular 
reason, for example that they could not travel or were geographically remote from the FRU, 
as might often be the case in parts of Wales, in particular: this issue would need to be 
addressed with particular care in rural and other parts of the country where public transport 
is inadequate and the roads are slow. Modernised court IT might also assist by permitting 
remote hearings, e.g. for directions appointments – but as all practitioners will say, the 
importance of both parties’ physical presence in court on the day as an aid to settlement in 
many cases must not be forgotten. But it is suggested that something like twelve units 
around England and Wales staffed by c. 70 judge positions (including deputies, providing c 
50 weeks’ judicial work pa) would be needed (see appendix below for our methodology). 
These units could have judges with a money specialty allocated to them, which could be 
Circuit Judges or District Judges as appropriate, in the numbers necessary to deal with cases 
likely to arise in those areas. A particular judge might be able to choose to spend, say, 
between 50 to 100% of his/her judicial itinerary in a unit. Recorders and Deputy District 
Judges would need to establish money expertise to secure a sitting within a unit. There 
could be guidance on allocation as between different levels of judges within a unit. The 
financial consent orders currently dealt with in the divorce centres could be most efficiently 
placed in the units, which would be made easier if financial remedy applications were 
permitted to be independent of the divorce file, as was recommended by the Financial 
Remedies Working Group. Financial remedy applications would be issued within the units, 
who would have their own dedicated HMCTS staff. Money enforcement could be similarly 
rationalised within the units, with obvious advantages over the current system. The units 
could enhance consistency by exchanging data and policy views through a national network 
of FRUs, which could be presided over by a Family Division money judge. 
It is acknowledged that the establishment of these units would have a financial cost in terms 
of the loss of flexibility of judicial deployment. To some extent, we would hope that the 
increased efficiency associated with the use of specialist judges – who might be expected, 
for example, more often to crack cases at FDR stage – would help recoup the costs 
associated with the Units’ establishment.  However, were those savings not sufficient of 
themselves to cover the costs, one might contemplate the creation of a carefully graduated 
fee system for contested hearings, designed to encourage settlement, in place of the single 
(modest) fee currently charged for applications.  While this is not a central aspect of our 
proposal, it seems necessary to make some effort to tackle it here in order to anticipate an 
obvious objection to our main idea. 
 
We do not feel that the fee for consent order applications should be raised – it is clearly 
important not to deter parties who have reached agreement from having that agreement 
enshrined in a court order. But parties who commence contested litigation of their financial 
issues, certainly if they get as far as an FDR appointment, might be expected to pay 
increased costs at that stage, and at Final Hearing stage, in recognition of the additional 
court time being taken.  It would be essential that income from this source be ring-fenced 
for the operation of the FRUs: there is no reason why these litigants should be subsidising 
other parts of the court system (or Treasury more generally). 
In making this suggestion to raise court fees, we are conscious that the current fee for 
contested financial remedy applications of £255 is very modest in comparison to fees 
charged for money claims in the civil courts (though this is on top of the £550 now charged 
for divorce petitions, a figure well in excess of the cost to the court system of processing the 
average divorce: the Justice Select Committee has recently recommended that it be reduced 
to its former level). It seems to us surprising that, by way of contrast, issue fees for money 
claims are now graduated based on the value of the claim (with an eye-wateringly high issue 
fee for £10,000 for claims worth more than £200,000) whilst a money claim of any size or 
complexity in the family court, however much court time is used, attracts a fee of only £255.   
We would not commend an issue fee for financial remedy cases: issuing Form A can itself be 
an effective tool for prompting settlement.  Nor would we commend an approach based 
(exclusively) on the value of the case: (i) valuation can sometimes itself a  heavily contested 
matter that may not be resolved until late in the case; and (ii) given the geographical 
variation in house prices, it would not be fair to set fee-levels in such a way that where one 
lived of itself dictated a higher or lower fee when the nature and complexity of the issues at 
stake were identical to other, much lower-value cases from elsewhere in the jurisdiction.  
And so we wonder whether some way might be found to scale fees for FDRs and then Final 
Hearings in a way that reflected the time-estimate for the case, or perhaps a combination of 
that and the value at stake (with thresholds set in such a way as to minimise the chances of 
difference in fee being based largely on location).  It could perhaps be a case management 
decision for the judge at First Appointment to classify the case for these purposes.  
Such a scheme would more accurately reflect the demand of the case on the court’s 
resources and provide an extra (if modest) incentive for parties to settle at each stage. 
Acknowledging that complexity can be a feature of low value cases, it would be important to 
ensure that applicants in such cases were not prevented from pursuing a case by a 
disproportionately high fee, and so an appropriate waiver system might be needed at the 
lower end. Costs rules could, of course, be used to ensure that applicants did not end up 
bearing these costs where it was the unreasonable conduct of the respondent which caused 
the case to be contested and to continue through the court. 
 
Closing remarks 
We are grateful to professional colleagues who commented on an earlier draft of this article 
and who raised with us a number of points which we hope to have gone at least some way 
to address in revising the piece for publication.  We are conscious that whilst there might be 
support for the principle of ticketing in this area, there are a number of practical difficulties 
and risks which would need careful navigation for the proposed scheme to produce its 
intended benefits. We would welcome further feedback from readers of Family Law.  
 
 
Note by the President 
Further significant reform of the practice and procedure in relation to both divorce cases and 
financial remedy cases – which I continue to believe need to be ‘un-coupled’ and handled separately 
in future – is unavoidable and in any event highly desirable. Edward Hess and Joanna Miles, with 
their great experience of these matters, have identified what they see as the problem in relation to 
our present handling of financial remedy cases and, even more important, they have suggested 
solutions. Their analysis is compelling and their proposals attractive. They are to be thanked for 
having initiated an important debate, in which, I hope, everyone will participate. I suspect that many 
will agree the pressing need for change. Our present arrangements are probably untenable. It may 
be that the only real question is what different arrangements we should have in future. Be that as it 
may, and some perhaps will disagree, what is surely important is that we all give the most careful 
attention to what Hess and Miles are saying. 
James Munby, PFD 
4 October 2016  
APPENDIX 
 
Methodology for attempting to calculate number of FRU / fte judges required 
This is not an easy exercise, and much more detailed work would be needed that we are 
able to provide here. But to try to give a ballpark sense of the likely requirement, we offer 
some rather rough and ready calculations on the back of which we have attempted to 
suggest roughly how many judge positions and how many FRUs would be needed.  
All figures on which we have made our calculations in this article and its appendix are taken 
from the tables for Family Court Statistics Quarterly Q4 2015, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/family-court-statistics-quarterly-october-to-
december-2015.  All figures regarding applications must be regarded as estimates as there is 
a known problem with the family case management system undercounting money 
applications by around 10%; most missing cases are thought to be consent applications. 
There are more applications and disposals each year than there are cases, and it might be 
assumed that contested cases will involve more, and more contested, disposals than other 
cases. But for the purposes of the discussion in the text above and here we have adopted 
the percentages for disposals by consent or otherwise (calculated from HMCTS figures for 
2015 in table 10 of the source cited above) as a basis for (what is necessarily) rough 
calculation of case-equivalents. In the process, we may therefore over-estimate how many 
cases ultimately require a contested final hearing. 
If we take the national 2015 figure of 37,924 financial remedies cases (rounded to 38,000), 
and further assume (by reference to the HMCTS rates for types of disposals) that around 
65% of these (24,700) are pure consent application cases, this leaves 13,300 contested 
cases.  Research by Hitchings, Miles and Woodward (based on court files with a final order 
in financial remedy proceedings on divorce in four courts taken from the period 2011-12, 
pre-LASPO therefore: Assembling the Jigsaw Puzzle… University of Bristol, 2013) suggests 
that a significant minority of cases resolve without needing a First Appointment (in their 
study, around 16% of all initially contested cases settled at that very early stage). Those 
findings cannot be assumed to be nationally representative (and only included cases that 
did conclude with a final order), but if applied to the national total could see around 2,000 
of the 13,300 cases settle without needing a substantive court appointment (other than 
perhaps using the FA fixture to approve the consent order). But we shall assume here, very 
conservatively, that all of these 13,300 cases would at least be listed for a First 
Appointment, but anticipate that in practice a significant number of these appointments 
would be vacated or turned into an approval hearing. We shall further assume, by reference 
to Hitchings et al’s findings, that 55% of these 13,300 initially contested cases (c.7,300) 
would require an FDR, a significant further number of cases settling before the FDR (in some 
such cases, the FDR fixture might again turn into an approval hearing). As for final hearings, 
the HMCTS data for disposals indicate that 9% of these in 2015 were fully contested, but as 
we note above, in view of the fact that the disposals total is greater than the cases total and 
since one might assume that fully contested cases might have more disposals during their 
lifetime than other cases, to assume that 9% of final hearings will be contested may well be 
an over-estimate; for example, just 5% of cases in Hitchings et al’s study of cases with a final 
order were fully contested. On the other hand, given the likelihood that cases contested at 
any stage may have more contested disposals within them, the higher figure may help cover 
that element of the work associated with litigation in financial remedy proceedings. So 
taking the more conservative 9% figure (of all cases; c.25% of initially contested cases) might 
produce around 3,400 final hearings (or 3,400 total hearings, including both final hearings 
and contested interim/ancillary matters).  
Translating these figures into judge requirements is complicated by the fact that the court 
time taken to hear final hearings will hugely differ, perhaps between one day and many 
days, and also noting that the figures do not include other interim hearings (MPS 
applications, Section 37 applications, Costs allowance applications etc.). Assuming one judge 
position (including deputy cover) could on average deal with one final hearing, 6 FDR/First 
Appointments as well as other interim applications and consent orders each week for, say, 
50 weeks per year then approximately 70 FRU judge positions (including deputy cover) 
nationally should be able to deal with the case load (70 x 50 final hearings = 3,500, 70 x 300 
FDR/First Appointments = 21,000). This might equate to 12 FRUs containing 6 judge 
positions in each FRU, although the balance of numbers would have to be shifted in favour 
of regions with higher or more complex caseloads – the FRU at the CFC currently has 8 judge 
positions. 
 
 
